Ventana software support forum

I would argue that the problem is a Tragedy of the Commons =
argument, with the resource being esteem or some other measure of =
whether the manager looks good or bad. Were the two managers part =
of different companies, the problem would fit one aspect of the =
Tragedy of the Commons argument. Manager of department A is =
creating a positive externality for the manager of B. But, manager =
A is not benefiting from the costs, while manager B is not paying =
the costs for the benefits received.

Similarly farmer A might cut back on use of a common pasture =
(incuring an opportunity cost), but receives nothing in return. =
Farmer B doesnt pay the cost and does receive the benefit of As =
forgone use.

This part of the argument only points out the disincentive to be a =
good citizen. The example does not fit as well with the =
explanation of why people actively deplete a resource: when the =
resource becomes scarce, people may race to use them before they =
disappear.

One suggestion has been that placing a resource under one private =
entity, like a company, will solve the Commons problem. Thus, the =
Enclosures as a solution. What Demings example points out (I =
believe the original had to do with airplane maintenance) is that =
this is not necessarily the case. The company is structuring the =
situation internally as if the two departments were completely =
independent, creating the possibility of positive and negative =
externalities. What then is the point in having a company with =
those two departments? Management action needs to be evaluated =
according to the overall health of the company, not the department.

Similarly, Farmer A would be more likely to restrict the use of the =
commons if there were social institutions in place that rewarded =
that behavior. In many small-scale societies with common property =
resources, people who act in this way do receive something like =
esteem. Anthropologists like James Acheson, Bonnie McCay, and =
Fikret Berkes have described these instances.

Nick Flanders
Institute of Arctic Studies
From: Nicholas.E.Flanders@Dartmouth.EDU (Nicholas E. Flanders)

Seems to me that this is not a dynamic behavior that results from structure,
but rather a higher level concept well articulated by Demming and at the core
of why a systemic view is so powerful. It is simply that optimizing
components will not oprimize the system. The interesting corollary is that it
is necessary to suboptimize components to truly produce the best system
behavior. This is why, for example, that a functional organization (as in the
example given), not driven by business compromises, is so prone to poor
results; and why viewing the "whole elephant" is so essential to improving
performance. The whole elephant is, of course, that structure which is vital
to achieving the goals in terms of system behavior.
Dave Packer; Systems Thinking Collaborative
From: DGPacker@aol.com

comment on the problem of tragedy of the commons:
in our own experience for business models, if ever a problem of tragedies of
the commons appears, this is a sure indication, that the business
segmentation is not done correctly.
so instead of treating a problem of the tragedy of the commons, we advice to
look for disentangling the business segments involved as the proper
solution.

// yours sincerely ulrich la roche
fast focus consulting
heilighuesli 18, CH-8053 Zuerich,
switzerland
fax +411 382 1349
From: ularoch@ibm.net

MANY COMPANIES MUST FACE THIS PROBLEM. ARCO BRINGS THESE VARIOUS DEPT HEADS
IN, LISTENS TO THEIR APPEAL, ANALYSES THEIR ARGUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
OVERALL BENEFIT TO THE WHOLE AND DISTRIBUTES ITS PROFITS ACCORDING TO THAT
EVALUATION. SURELY THIS IS STANDARD.



Bruce Hannon, Jubilee Professor
From: Bruce Hannon <b-hannon@uiuc.edu>
Liberal Arts and Sciences
Geog/NCSA
220 Davenport Hall, MC 150
University of Illinois
Urbana, IL 61801
reply to: b-hannon@uiuc.edu
Vita: http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~j-domier/people/hannon.html
Example Models: http://blizzard.gis.uiuc.edu/
Books: http://www.springer-ny.com/biology/moddysys/
217 333-0348 office
217 244 1785 fax